Marxism, the law and the 1998 waterfront dispute(1)
By MARK GILLESPIE [email protected]
The 1998 waterfront dispute was the most serious challenge to trade union power in Australia for at least a decade. One of the most powerful unions, the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), faced a concerted attempt by Patrick Stevedores (Patrick), the federal Coalition government and the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF), to smash its power. The MUA, nonetheless, survived this attack. Even though the MUA made enormous concessions to the demands of Patrick to cut costs in the final settlement, when the scale and severity of the attack is considered, the outcome of the dispute has to be judged as a victory for the union.
How did the MUA win? Many commentators argue the courts were central to determining the outcome of the dispute. Rather than use industrial action to close down the entire waterfront and risk being sued for breaching the secondary boycott provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA), the MUA instead turned to the courts to challenge the legality of Patrick’s actions. The success of these court challenges led Jennie George, the President of the ACTU, to argue, "the rule of law can protect the interests of ordinary people against the might of corporations and the might of government"(2). Others draw similar conclusions. Terry Evans, an official with the Queensland Teachers’ Union, argues, "the Maritime Union dispute was won in the media and in the courts without involving industrial action"(3). Braham Dabscheck argues, "Patrick’s ‘ace’ was ‘trumped’ by the Freedom of Association provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996..."(4). Ronald McCallum argues, "the law defended the right of workers to belong to a trade union of their choice, even though this outcome interfered with the usual rights to accumulate capital."(5)
This article challenges this analysis of the dispute. While it is true, the union movement did not respond with mass strikes, Evans is wrong to say the dispute was won, "without involving industrial action". Evans overlooks the militant mass picketing that effectively closed Patrick’s operations. This article will argue these pickets were central to determining the outcome of the dispute. While acknowledging the MUA did win favourable decisions in the courts, these decisions, it will be argued, were merely a reflection of the struggle taking place outside the gates of Patrick.
In arguing the dispute was determined industrially rather than in the courts, this article criticises the strategy pursued by the MUA and Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). This strategy focused too heavily on the courts at the expense of industrial action. The result of holding back the industrial struggle and relying on the courts is the unions made more concessions than necessary.
Theoretically, this article will be a defence of Marxism. Marxists argue the courts and other institutions of the state are not neutral but tools of oppression in the hands of the ruling classes. "The state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy" wrote Engels in 1879(6). Marxists, too, reject the idea that workers’ interests can be defended by appeals to elites and advocate workers’ "self-activity" as an alternative. "For almost forty years", wrote Marx and Engels, "we have stressed the class struggle as the immediate driving power of history...When the International was formed we expressly formulated the battle-cry: The emancipation of the working class is conquered by the working class themselves"(7).
If the "the rule of law can protect the interests of ordinary people"; if the 1998 dispute was won ‘without involving industrial action’; as Jennie George, Evans and others assert, then surely Marxism is refuted? If these above assertions are correct, then surely Social Democratic theory -- that argues the state is neutral and able to arbitrate between contending classes (8) -- is confirmed? In arguing the 1998 waterfront dispute was determined industrially rather than in the courts, this article will defend Marxist theory against such propositions.
Was there justice?
It is argued the law defended the ‘interests of ordinary people’. Is this the case? The MUA allege Patrick breached the WRA and other industrial law when they dismissed their entire unionised workforce on the night of 7 April and replaced them with a non-union workforce trained by the NFF. They also allege Patrick and others were involved in an illegal conspiracy to breach the above law.
These allegations, however, were never tested in a full trial. The dispute was resolved with an ‘out of court’ settlement. So in formal legal terms, there is no proven guilt on Patrick’s behalf, and therefore, no justice to be dispersed by the courts.
The obvious question is; why did the MUA settle "out of court"? There are a number of possible options.
Option 1: They felt the settlement was fair, adequately compensating the union members for the wrongdoing against them.
Option 2: They assessed their legal argument was weak, so a settlement was the best option.
Option 3: They settled because there was no other alternative. "Real justice" was not going to be attained by continuing to trial.
This article argues it was the last option; "real justice" was denied.
The first option -- the deal was fair -- can be ruled out with a quick examination of the final settlement. The MUA made enormous concessions. Out of a total full-time workforce of 1427, the MUA agreed to over 600 retrenchments. Approximately two thirds of Patrick’s workforce are now casual. The MUA agreed to the outsourcing of maintenance, security, cleaners, line marking and more. Salaries are annualized reducing the wages of some workers by many thousands of dollars a year and the MUA agreed to a performance based bonus pay system.
These workplace changes produced substantial savings for Patrick estimated to be worth $40 million a year. The share value of Lang Corporation -- Patrick’s parent company -- escalated from $1.41 in July 1998 to $5.19 in March 1999 (9).
If we assume the MUA workers were a victim of a wrongdoing, it would be difficult to argue this outcome was fair. Patrick made significant financial gains, while the MUA members face a harsher and less secure future. For this reason, the first option -- the settlement was fair -- is ruled out.
Did the MUA settle because their legal argument was weak? Again, this option can be ruled out. In the appeals process leading up to the trial, six High Court judges and three Federal Court judges agreed with Justice North of the Federal Court, the MUA had an "arguable case" Patrick breached the WRA and was involved in an unlawful conspiracy.(10) Section 298K(1) of the WRA makes it illegal to victimise an employee for being in a union:
An employer must not, for a prohibited reason, or for reasons that include a prohibited reason, do or threaten to do any of the following:
(a) dismiss an employee;
(b) injure an employee in his or her employment;
(c) alter the position of an employee to the employee’s prejudice.
Section 298L(1) of the Act defines "prohibited reason" and includes being a member of an industrial association (11).
Patrick attempted to circumvent these provisions with an elaborate corporate restructure. Patrick argue their actions were legal because they did not dismiss the MUA members, only restructured them into ‘in house’ labour hire firms that were placed into voluntary administration. Unfortunately for Patrick, section 298K(1) makes it an offence not only to "dismiss" an employee for being in a union, but also to "(b) injure an employee in his or her employment" or to "(c) alter the position of an employee to the employee’s prejudice". The MUA produced substantial evidence to demonstrate the purpose behind Patrick’s restructure, was for no other reason than to victimise the unionists (12).
So why did the MUA settle for a less than satisfactory deal, if they had such a good legal argument? They settled because there was no other option. The courts ordered Patrick to cancel its contracts with the non-union contractors and to allow the MUA workers back onto the docks, but only -- and this is important -- "if the Administrators decide to resume trading" (13). In other words, the MUA workers would get their jobs back, only if the sham companies - created specifically to smash the MUA -- were made commercially viable.
This decision put the commercial viability of these sham companies above the rights of the MUA workers. The MUA could take the matter to trial, but the sham companies could be liquidated in the meantime. If these companies were liquidated, the only recourse for justice would be to sue for damages. Seeking damages from companies stripped of assets and capital, in itself, is a highly problematic task. Therefore, winning the trial would not necessarily guarantee the MUA workers continued employment or protect the MUA’s control over the supply of labour. This is hardly a suitable outcome from a union perspective as it would allow Patrick to effectively ‘buy out’ the union. Given this grim reality, the MUA had no other option than to accept Patrick’s offer to negotiate a settlement.
Once the MUA decided to negotiate, however, they negotiated with their hands tied behind their back. During normal Enterprise Bargaining negotiations, unions have the right to strike, while employers have the right to ‘lock out’ their workforce, but not to sack them. During the negotiations at the conclusion of the 1998 dispute, the MUA could not strike (14), and negotiated with the threat of the sham companies being liquidated at any time.
Although Patrick carried out many dubious activities most certainly outside the law, they nonetheless benefited significantly from these activities. So rather than the 1998 dispute demonstrating the "rule of law can protect the interests of ordinary people", the contrary was observed. The law served the interests of capital at the expense of workers’ rights.
Picket line justice
As demonstrated above, the MUA workers were denied "real justice" in the courts. However Patrick did not win entirely in the courts. Patrick wanted to completely de-unionise, but the courts stymied their plans. Patrick were directed to cancel their contracts with the non-union companies and to accept the MUA workforce back onto the docks.
Patrick’s Counsel contested these orders, arguing that if the law was breached, then the most effective remedy was to award damages (15). Had the courts followed this advice, it would have profoundly affected the outcome of the dispute. As Stephen Long, writing for The Australian Financial Review, observed:
Patrick would be less bothered by the alternative remedy of compensation ... It would still have rid itself of its MUA leaving it free to resume operations using an "outsourced" labour force employed by the NFF’s union busting company (16).
The courts, however, rejected Patrick’s argument and ordered reinstatement. Does the rejection of Patrick’s argument contradict the Marxist theory of the state? Did the MUA get "some justice", if not "complete justice", from the courts? The answer is no. What the MUA received from the courts was a result of industrial struggle.
According to those who defend the neutrality of the judiciary, judges are meant to make decisions free from outside influences. Their role is merely to assess the facts of the case and interpret the law as written by the parliament. However, reality is somewhat different from this idealised account. Judges’ decisions are influenced by their class, gender and ethnic background and they will modify their decisions to suit objective realities. The Australian Financial Review recognised this pragmatism of the judiciary. In their editorial on 21 April, they argue that, "Mr Justice North must be under considerable pressure to play fairy godmother to the Maritime Union of Australia" (17). To understand why the judges ordered reinstatement rather than award damages, we need to understand this "considerable pressure" the judges were under.
The Picket Lines
When the judges were deliberating, militant mass picketing had effectively closed Patrick’s businesses. These pickets had a substantial economic impact -- not only on Patrick -- but also the national economy (18). The pickets, too, were illegal. Patrick received court injunctions restricting them in three states. The picketers not only defied the courts but also the police who came to enforce the injunctions. In Sydney, the picketers faced mass arrests and in Fremantle, police with riot shields and batons. The most dramatic stand off between picketers and police, however, developed outside Melbourne’s East Swanson dock.
The Battle for East Swanson Dock
East Swanson dock is one of Australia’s biggest container terminals. If the picket could be broken here, their overall impact would be significantly weakened. Victoria’s Premier, Jeff Kennett, had a reputation for being tough on unions and demonstrators. On 16 April, the Melbourne Port Corporation obtained an injunction banning the MUA from obstructing the Corporation’s land. The government began talking tough with the Police Minister, Bill McGath, warning of a "bloody battle" (19). Rumours circulated that a police crack down was imminent as hundreds of police began assembling at the dock.
The trade unionists, however, were not intimidated. Barricades -- dubbed a community art project -- were assembled across the entrance using old car bodies, containers, welded railway lines and more. More than 4,000 protesters camped out that night defending the barricades. Victorian Trades Hall Secretary, Leigh Hubbard, declared, "they will not get those bloody containers out of that place" (20). The dispute, too, had the potential to escalate industrially. A meeting of 3000 union delegates voted to call snap strikes if the picket line was forcibly removed (21).
At four in the morning, police began lining up at the gate as a helicopter circled above. More MUA supporters began heading to the dock to reinforce the blockade. At eight, that morning a march of 2000 construction workers arrived. For a period, the police were sandwiched between the construction workers and the protesters. It became clear to the police it would take a huge confrontation to break the picket. Not long after that, they reassessed their operation and beat a speedy retreat. This was the last serious attempt to use force to break the MUA pickets, and it was a crucial turning point in the dispute. While the state authorities had the resources to break the picket line, what they lacked was the resolve.
This was the reality the judges faced as they deliberated. Illegal pickets blockaded Patrick and the police did not have the resolve to break them. The WRA did not oblige the judges to order reinstatement and they were perfectly entitled to award damages (22). Awarding damages, however, would not have changed the reality outside the gates of Patrick. The picketers had already demonstrated their determination to maintain the blockades until all the sacked unionists were reinstated.
Had reinstatement not been ordered, and had the pickets remained, the state authorities would have faced a real dilemma. Either use massive force to break them and potentially escalate the dispute (something they already showed they were not prepared to do), or alternatively, leave Patrick’s isolated, forcing them to negotiate with the MUA out of economic necessity. Neither of these options was a viable solution to the dispute from a ruling class perspective. To end the blockade, it was necessary to make a concession and order reinstatement. Reinstatement was ordered, however, in such a way that the MUA returned to work and negotiated with the threat the sham companies could be liquidated at any time. Although the MUA did win favourable decisions in the courts, these decisions were not a product of "legal syllogistic logic" -- as McCallum argues (23) -- but a product of the balance of forces outside Patrick’s gate.
This analysis can be criticised because it relies on some conjecture as to what the judges and state authorities were thinking at the time of their decision making. Interestingly though, it is not only Marxists who argue the dispute was determined industrially. The anti-union forces draw similar conclusions. Tom Burton, from the Australian Financial Review, for example, writes:
But if North had received some unkind comments, they are relatively mild compared with the shellacking the State premiers - in particular Jeff Kennett - have been getting for not ensuring Patrick could clear the wharves.
It was the pickets that stymied the commercial viability of the plan and that became a huge rallying point for the unions (24).
Patrick’s Managing Director, Chris Corrigan, too, in a speech to The Australian Institute of Company Directors, does not mention the court rulings against his company, but severely criticises the Victorian Police complaining that they "did not do their job". Corrigan warns his audience of the "lasting significance of that inaction by the police".
You can be certain that every major dispute from now on will be accompanied by a "community protests" which blocks the offending gates. As an industrial tactic it is faultless … (25).
If the outcome of the dispute was determined in the courts, why would Corrigan be so concerned about the "inaction by the police" and its "lasting significance"? Surely reinstatement would be ordered regardless of what the police did? The reality is, the law does not operate in a vacuum of pure objectivity and Chris Corrigan understood this. The dispute was not determined in the courts, but as The Australian Financial Review recognised, "where it counts -- on the water’s edge" (26). The court’s decisions merely reflected this reality established at the "water’s edge".
Could more have been achieved?
As demonstrated above, the pickets were central to determining the outcome of the dispute. The pickets placed ‘considerable pressure’ on the judges to order reinstatement. It has to be recognised, however, the industrial impact of the pickets was limited. Only thirteen percent of Australia’s stevedoring capacity was effected by the dispute (27). Two MUA national stoppages in September 1994 and November 1995, by comparison, shut down the waterfront completely. This raises the question, had the entire waterfront been at a standstill, or had the ACTU thrown its industrial weight behind the MUA, could the unions have achieved more? This article argues yes.
While some commentators on the dispute recognise the importance of the pickets in determining its outcome, they resist drawing the above conclusion. Griffin and Svensen, for example, argue the pickets shaped the "judgments of the judges"(28). On extending the industrial action, however, they argue it was crucial the MUA "did not resort to illegal industrial action" (29).
Why support illegal picketing but not illegal strikes? It is argued the MUA would have fallen into a trap because once they engaged in illegal secondary boycotts, they would be sued into bankruptcy. Dabscheck, for example, argues, "They [the government and Patrick] believed that the MUA would pursue industrial action, willy-nilly, which would render it bankrupt and defenseless" (30). McCallum argues the government wanted to manoeuvre the MUA into "a position from which it would defend itself by taking industrial action" (31). Matters argues "the Government’s strategy was to provoke an all out waterfront dispute" (32). Wiseman argues the government’s aim was "to provoke the MUA into industrial action" (33).
The Secondary Boycott Laws
I question this analysis of the anti-union laws. Rather than the laws being a trap waiting for the unions to fall into, the laws are used to intimidate unions from taking effective industrial action. That can be demonstrated in a number of ways.
If Patrick and the government’s "strategy" were to "provoke" the MUA and then sue them into bankruptcy, then surely they would be most disappointed when their "strategy" failed. Patrick sacked its entire unionised workforce -- surely a massive provocation -- but still the MUA and the ACTU did not respond with illegal strikes.
Rather than being disappointed, however, the confidence of the anti-union forces soared. The value of Lang Corporation’s shares rose by 30 percent in the first week of the dispute when it became clear the unions would not respond industrially. Their confidence grew even higher after the MUA allowed the Australian Endeavour -- an MUA crewed ship -- to be stevedored by non-union labour without retaliatory action. Peter Reith interrupted his Easter holiday to gloat, describing it as a "decisive and historic moment" (34). Chris Corrigan described it as the "final nail" into the MUA’s campaign saying "yes, I do think we’ve won" (35). The Australian Financial Review began writing obituaries for the MUA; "The good news from the waterfront is that Patrick Stevedores is winning the battle for the wharves where it counts -- on the water’s edge itself" (36). The anti-union forces were confident because they felt the laws were successfully intimidating the unions.
This analysis is further confirmed, when we examine what happened to the unions that did take unprotected industrial action during the dispute. The threat to sue failed to materialise. The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce, for example, publicly advised its members to sue for damages if affected by a general stoppage on 6 May (37). The strike went ahead and approximately 80,000 rallied in Melbourne, but no union was fined or sued. Building workers, transport workers, storemen and packers and others, all took unprotected industrial action throughout the dispute, but none of these unions were sued or fined. This demonstrates that the purpose of the laws is to intimidate the unions from taking effective action. When they fail to intimidate, the laws are useless.
This analysis is further confirmed when we examine the post-dispute commentary from the anti-union side. The anti-union side curses the effectiveness of the pickets but acknowledge the situation could have been worse if the WRA had not been so effective. Judith Sloan, for example, a Coalition government appointee to the Productivity Commission, writes:
The fact that the Australian waterfront was not completely inactive during the dispute is very important. Not only did the partial continuation of services dilute the potential insistence of users (both importers and exporters) of stevedoring services that the government bring the dispute to an end but the partial continuation of stevedoring activity also underscored the efficiency of legislative changes implemented by the federal government in 1996. On this point, sympathy industrial action affecting other industries was also largely absent (38).
Sloan argues that the confinement of the dispute to Patrick was beneficial to the employers, allowing more concessions to be extracted from the MUA:
The continuation of stevedoring services with P&O workers (and Sealand workers at the Port of Adelaide) remaining on the job throughout the dispute was a crucial factor. Without this development, the changes effected through the Patrick enterprise agreement would not have been forthcoming (39).
Heather Ridout, writing for the Australian Industry Group, makes a similar assessment:
… the new Workplace Relations Act (1996) and the secondary boycott provisions of the Trade Practices Act were very effective in preventing the spread of the dispute to other industries. Prior to this legislation, this dispute would of caused immediate and major economic dislocation and imposed unsustainable costs on Australian industry (40).
As demonstrated above, the laws are meant to intimidate the unions. When the unions fail to be intimidated, the laws turn out to be paper tigers. The reality is, the unions have the collective power to make the cost of using the law against them more than what it is worth. As Heather Ridout admitted above, a protracted strike on the waterfront would have lead to ‘unsustainable’ costs.
For this reason, this article criticises the MUA and the ACTU for confining the dispute to Patrick. The potential was there to lead a campaign of mass solidarity strikes. Unionists understood this was not just an attack on the MUA, but on all unions and many thousands rallied to the cause. The May Day march in Brisbane that year was the biggest for at least thirty years. Over 80,000 marched in Melbourne to support the MUA. There was substantial support, too, for an industrial campaign. John Thompson, the ACTU(Q) state secretary told a public meeting in Brisbane he was spending all his time "putting out fires" (41). A poll taken of Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union members, showed that 53.6 percent supported illegal industrial action in support of the MUA (42). This poll was presented to the members in a passive way without arguments for industrial action.
The union leaders did direct the anger created by the sackings into militant and defiant pickets, but stopped short of directing it into a campaign of mass strikes. The problem with confining the dispute to Patrick and avoiding taking on the anti-union laws is that when Patrick offered a less than satisfactory compromise, the union leaders had no other alternative than to accept it. Continuing the legal action was not an option. The result of only going halfway is that they were forced to settle for half a victory. This need not have been the case. Mass strikes could have crippled industry and forced the employers to settle.
It is useful to contrast the outcome of the 1998 dispute with the outcome of the 1969 strikes against the "penal powers". Mass strikes erupted in 1969 after Clarie O’Shea, a tramways union official, was jailed for refusing to pay fines accumulated by his union for unlawful industrial action. These mass strikes not only freed O’Shea, but also in the process, made the penal powers - the anti-union laws at the time - "virtually inoperative"(43). The smashing of the penal powers allowed the unions to go on the offensive in the following years.
The 1998 union victory was not nearly as decisive. Jobs and conditions were traded off; the WRA is still used to intimidate unions; while the employers’ offensive continues. As Orsag and Glanz observed, "The MUA would survive, but so too would the WRA" (44).
Because the unions did not decisively win, more attacks can be expected from the employers and government. Peter Reith is already proposing a ‘second wave’ of anti-union legislation, while BHP is attempting to break union organisation in its iron ore operations. To defend its interests, the union movement will have to struggle. For that reason it is important we draw out the correct lessons from the 1998 dispute. These lessons are:
·the courts did not defend workers’ interests
(For more on the MUA dispute see Tom Bramble's War on the Waterfront).
1. This article is based on an Honours dissertation and was presented as a paper to the ‘Rethinking Marxism in Australia’ conference. Gillespie, M. 1999, "The 1998 waterfront dispute: a Marxist analysis", Honours Dissertation, Griffith University, 29th October.
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2. In The Australian, 1998, "Labour Activists Applaud Triumph of Underdogs", 24th April, p.5.
3. Evans, T. 1998, "The fall and rise of union membership", Queensland Teachers’ Journal. September 3rd, p.7.
4. Dabscheck, B. 1998, "The Waterfront Dispute: Of Vendetta and the Australian Way", The Economic and Labour Relations Review, Vol.9, No.2, p.181.
5. McCallum, R. 1998, "A Priority of Rights: Freedom of Association and the Waterfront Dispute", Australian Bulletin of Labour, Vol.24, No.3, p.207.
6. Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1976, On the Paris Commune, Progress Publishers: Moscow, p.34.
7. Quoted in Callinicos, A. 1983, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, Bookmarks: London, p.141.
8. Karl Kautsky, a founding member of the German Social Democratic Party, described the modern capitalist state as an "instrument of the emancipation for workers". In Cliff, T. 1975, Lenin Volume 2: All Power to the Soviets, Pluto Press: London.
9. In Bachelard, M. 1999, "Dust finally settles to show real dock winners", The Australian. 5th April, p.4.
10. Maritime Union of Australia & Others v Patrick Stevedores No.1 Pty Ltd (under administration) (ACN 003 621 645) & Others  378 FCA (21 April 1998). Mr Justice North, Federal Court of Australia, No. VG 152 of 1998.
11. Workplace Relations Act 1996, 1997, Reprint No.3. Attorney General’s Department, p.391.
12. Evidence included a ministerial briefing paper demonstrating that Patrick, Peter Reith and others were involved in discussions about dismissing the unionised workforce. See Maritime Union of Australia & Others v Patrick Stevedores No.1 Pty Ltd, 21st April 1998.
13. Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia  HCA 30 (4 May 1998) Chief Justice Brennan, Justices Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan, High Court of Australia, M29/1998.
14. The MUA gave up the right to strike as part of an undertaking to Justice North who was concerned about the commercial viability of the companies hiring the MUA labour. See Maritime Union of Australia & Others v Patrick Stevedores No.1 Pty Ltd, 21st April 1998.
15. See Maritime Union of Australia & Others v Patrick Stevedores No.1 Pty Ltd, 21st April 1998.
16. Long, S. 1998, "Corrigan’s carefully calculated legal gamble", The Australian Financial Review, 9th April, p.11.
17. The Australian Financial Review, 1998, "Patrick’s money trail", 21st April.
18. See Miller, C. 1998, "Picket blocks $500m cargo", The Age, 17th April, Available URL: http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980417/news/news3.html
19. In Hannan, E. and Kermond, C. 1998, "We will not be moved: unions", The Age, 18th April, Available URL:http://demos.anu.edu.au:7007/cgibin/p…ir=years/1998/apr/8/hansard/reps&art =3.
20. In Hannan, E. and Kermond, C. 1998.
21. In Hannan, E. and Kermond, C. 1998.
22. Justice Ian Callinan of the High Court in fact did recommend this in a dissenting judgement. See Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia, 4th May 1998.
23. McCallum, R. 1998, p.216.
24. Burton, T. 1998, "Courting an electoral disaster", The Australian Financial Review, 1st May, p.43.
25. Corrigan, C. 1999, Speech to the Australian Institute of Company Directors, 16th March, p.6, Available URL: http://www.patrick.com.au/speeches-160399.html
26. The Australian Financial Review, 1998, "Reinventing a government", 14th April, p.20.
27. See Bureau of Transport Economics, 1998, Waterline. Issue No.16, September, p.1.
28. Griffin, G. and Svensen, S. 1998, "Industrial Relations Implications of the Australian Waterside Dispute", Australian Bulletin of Labour, Vol.24, No.3, p.202.
29. Griffin, G. and Svensen, S. 1998, p.200.
30. Dabscheck, B. 1998, p.158.
31. McCallum, R. 1998, p.212.
32. Matters, D. 1999, The Strategy and tactics of the MUA Dispute: An answer to "War on the Waterfront", Communist Party of Australia: Sydney, p.11.
33. Wisemen, J. 1998, "Here to Stay? The 1997-1998 Australian waterfront dispute and its implications", Labour & Industry, August, Vol.9, No.1, p.6.
34. Svensen, S. 1998, "Chronology of the Patrick Dispute", Available URL: http://www-personal. buseco.monash.edu.au:80/~svensen/ chronol.html
35. Hughes, J., Ellicott, J. and Green, P. 1998, "Competition watchdog turns heat on MUA", The Australian. 13th April.
36. The Australian Financial Review, 1998, 14th April, p.20.
37. Kermond, C. 1998, "Employers sue threat on vote for strike", The Age, 10th April, Available URL: http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980410/news/news3.html
38. Sloan, J. 1998, "An economic analysis of the 1998 Patrick Dispute", The Economic and Labour Relations Review, Vol.9, No.2, December, p.240.
39. Sloan, J. 1998, p.245.
40. Ridout, H. 1998, "A Confluence of Many Tensions", Perspectives on Work, Vol.2, No.1, Industrial Relations Research Association, p.25.
41. Bramble, T. (1998), War on the Waterfront, Brisbane Defend Our Unions Committee: Brisbane.
42. Cameron. D. (1998) "National survey of members showed support for MUA’. The Manufacturing Worker. Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union. Vol.4, No.2, May/June.
43. Turner, I and Sandercock, L. 1983, In Union is Strength: A History of Trade Unions in Australia, 1788-1983, Nelson: Melbourne.
44. Orsag, T. and Glanz, D. 1999, "The workers united will never be defeated: The fight against the Workplace Relations Act and the Second Wave , Socialist Worker: Melbourne.
1. This article is based on an Honours dissertation and was presented as a paper to the ‘Rethinking Marxism in Australia’ conference. Gillespie, M. 1999, "The 1998 waterfront dispute: a Marxist analysis", Honours Dissertation, Griffith University, 29th October.
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